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European firms’ corporate biodiversity disclosures and board gender diversity from 2002 
to 2016  
 
Abstract 
We examine how board gender diversity is associated with biodiversity disclosures of a firm, and 
whether the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the EU biodiversity strategy reinforce this 
relationship. Using institutional theory and resource dependency theory, our sample comprises 
4,013 firm-year observations from European corporations covering data from 2002 to 2016. We 
use panel regressions with country, time and industry dummy variables to analyse the disclosure 
of biodiversity initiatives (DBI) and logit regressions to explain biodiversity impact assessment 
(BIA). We find that board gender diversity is positively associated with the DBI and BIA of a firm, 
and that the GRI framework and the EU biodiversity strategy positively moderate this relationship. 
Moreover, the GRI framework and the EU strategic plan show positive relationship with the DBI, 
rather than BIA. Altogether, our evidence suggests that corporate boards with a higher proportion 
of female directors are more sensitive to the concerns of institutional pressures and respond to 
those concerns by increasing corporate biodiversity disclosures. Overall, we find that firms tend 
to comply with the GRI framework and the EU 2020 strategy by undertaking symbolic biodiversity 
disclosures, rather than providing a comprehensive disclosure  of their impacts on biodiversity. 
 
Keywords: Biodiversity accounting, Board gender diversity, Corporate biodiversity initiatives, EU 







We contribute to a limited body of literature on the disclosure of a firm's biodiversity 
initiatives such as biodiversity related policies, procedures and activities meant to protect native 
biodiversity. “Biodiversity, as a term, refers to the variety of life on earth…..it includes the vast 
array of genetically distinct populations within species, as well as the full variety of species and 
communities, and ecosystems of which they are parts” (Earthwatch, 2002, p.11). Biodiversity is 
essential for human survival, but its rapid decline and the dangers of global climate change have 
stimulated debate. It is an essential underpinning of human activity and the human quality of life 
(Jones, 2014, p.4). Biodiversity disclosures are therefore an important source of information and 
an emerging area of research.  
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2007, p.7-8) observes that all organisations make 
direct (through own activities) and indirect (though supply chain partners) use of biodiversity 
resources, and thus contribute to changes in biodiversity’s quantity and quality. Consequently, 
corporate stakeholders (e.g., environmentalists, civil societies, regulators, and shareholders) exert 
pressure on firms to report and manage their impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems (GRI, 2007, 
p.8). Jones and Solomon (2013) contend that organisations should be held accountable for their 
actions on biodiversity. The UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), established in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992, is the main driving force to mobilise national and firm-specific initiatives to 
protect biodiversity. It is part of broad-based global efforts to combat biodiversity decline and 
climate change. The CBD has set out the Aichi biodiversity targets in Nagoya in 2010 and adopted 
the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 (CBD, 2010a). Biodiversity has grown in 
importance since 2010. The UN declared 2011-2020 as the UN Decade on Biodiversity (CBD, 
2010a). However, the CBD appears not to have shown noticeable success in reducing the rate of 
biodiversity loss (Siikamaki & Newbold, 2012). The European Union (EU) is widely considered 
to be a global leader in climate policy initiatives. It has adopted a ‘leadership-by-example’ 
approach. It has consistently advocated ‘targets and timetables’ for climate-related actions across 
economic sectors (Rayner & Jordan, 2016). Its Member States adopted the EU Biodiversity 




The EU biodiversity strategic plan includes operational targets and supporting action plans1 
to halt the loss biodiversity and to restore ecosystem from 2011-2020 (EC, 2015a). Therefore, the 
EU Biodiversity Strategy outlines guidelines, action plans and targets for industries and firms to 
develop, implement, disclose and monitor biodiversity related initiatives to protect biodiversity 
and ecosystems. However, since these action plans and targets are voluntary in nature, their 
implementations are largely dependent on firm-specific priorities and commitments.  
Meanwhile, self-regulatory institutions such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) have 
been instrumental in promoting corporate sustainability reporting (Milne & Gray, 2013). The GRI 
has joined other global institutions and national governments in influencing corporate initiatives 
to report and manage company impacts on biodiversity (GRI 2007, p.8).  
The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC, 2012) highlights the significance of 
corporate boards in shaping a firm’s sustainability agenda and addressing environmental concerns 
by integrating a firm’s biodiversity and ecosystem issues. The UNGC maintains that biodiversity 
issues pose a number of potential risks for a firm, including operational, reputational, regulatory 
and legal, market and financial risks, which might constrain a firm’s competitiveness, profitability 
and long-term viability (UNGC, 2012). Therefore, firms are exposed to pressures from corporate 
stakeholders and institutions to report and manage their impacts on biodiversity (GRI, 2007). 
Moreover, analysts, asset management companies, institutional investors and other market-
oriented institutions use firm level environmental, social and governance (ESG) indicators 
including biodiversity disclosures and activities to rank companies better (see OECD, 2019). 
Consequently, firms can engage in corporate sustainability initiatives in order to mitigate those 
risks, address multiple stakeholders’ concerns, and enhance financial performance and long-term 
survival capabilities (see de Villiers et al., 2011; Haque, 2017).  
The notion of gender diversity is considered to be a critical consideration for addressing 
biodiversity-related challenges. The CBD and the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) have recently recognised the significance of gender diversity in managing and conserving 
biodiversity, and the need to integrate a gender perspective into the biodiversity framework (CBD, 
2010b). For CBD (2015), the 2015-2020 Gender Plan of Action provides a mandate to address 
 
1 These targets and action plans maintain and restore ecosystems and their services; increase the contribution of 
agriculture and forestry in maintaining and enhancing biodiversity; and ensure the sustainable use of fisheries 




gender considerations. Nonetheless, as the CBD and IUCN highlight (CBD, 2015), there is a dearth 
of gender-sensitive biodiversity research. It is, therefore, important to examine if corporate 
governance indicators such as board gender diversity influence a firm’s biodiversity disclosures. 
Biodiversity disclosures appear to be particularly relevant in the European context, given the EU’s 
longstanding commitments to protect biodiversity and to promote gender diversity. Regulators in 
several European countries such as France, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and more 
recently Italy and the UK have, for example, adopted mandatory or voluntary provisions to 
enhance gender diversity on corporate boards (see, Rao & Tilt, 2016; Hollindale et al., 2019).  
Nevertheless, the existing empirical literature has failed to address the effect of board 
gender diversity on firm’s biodiversity disclosures. No studies have examined the effect of the 
interaction between the institutional context (such as the GRI framework and the EU biodiversity 
strategy) and  board gender diversity on corporate biodiversity disclosures.  
We examine the following two research questions: (i) Does board gender diversity 
influence the disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (DBI) and the biodiversity impact assessment 
(BIA) of a firm? (ii) How do the GRI framework and the 2020 EU biodiversity strategy moderate 
the influence of board gender diversity on DBI and BIA?  
 DBI is a disclosure score of overall biodiversity initiatives prepared by the authors. It is 
based on a firm’s disclosure of its biodiversity related policies, procedures, and activities. These 
are intended to minimise the adverse effects of a firm’s operations on biodiversity and to protect 
its native ecosystem and biodiversity. BIA is a dummy variable that measures whether or not a 
firm monitors its impacts on biodiversity through the usage of balanced scorecard or key 
performance indicators (KPIs). DBI and BIA provide alternative perspectives by measuring a 
firm’s  commitment to meet biodiversity-related challenges by disclosing information.  
This study makes the following contributions to the extant literature. First, we are among 
the first to empirically examine the influence of board gender diversity on a firm’s biodiversity-
related disclosures, and thus respond to the calls of the CBD and IUCN to undertake more gender-
specific biodiversity research (CBD, 2010b, 2015). We also complement other gender-specific 
research (e.g., Liao et al., 2015; Hollindale et al., 2019) by investigating whether female board 




Second, unlike other studies, we examine how institutional factors (such as the EU 2020 
biodiversity strategy and the GRI framework) moderate the effect of firm-specific corporate 
governance characteristics such as board gender diversity on biodiversity disclosures.  
Third, most biodiversity studies are qualitative. This is therefore one of the first quantitative 
studies to examine the firm-level and institutional determinants of a firm’s biodiversity disclosures 
and biodiversity impact assessment. Moreover, we use a new dataset (Thomson Reuters Asset4 
database) on European listed firms covering a long-time horizon (2002-2016). We also compare 
biodiversity disclosures between different European countries.  
Fourth, this study contributes towards a call for more evidence-based research, which is 
considered to be essential for the biodiversity global and national framework  to ensure efficient 
monitoring and recording of biodiversity obligations, activities and outcomes (JNCC and Defra, 
2012).  
Overall, our evidence contributes to the literature of institutional theory and resource 
dependency theory in explaining both the individual and interactive effects of gender diversity, the 
GRI framework and the EU biodiversity strategic plan on the disclosure of biodiversity initiatives 
and biodiversity impact assessment. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature, and develops hypotheses. Section 3 explains our methods, and section 4 
reports our findings. Section 5 provides discussions of our findings and section 6 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
2.1.  Theoretical literature 
According to institutional theory, organisations tend to comply with institutional rules, 
norms and expectations and maintain and enhance corporate legitimacy by complying with three 
forms of institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
For DiMaggio and Powell (1983), coercive isomorphism influences organisational structures and 
procedures through direct (e.g., government policies and regulations) and indirect (e.g., cultural 
expectations from society) institutional pressures. Second, firms tend to respond to uncertainties 




a process referred to as mimetic isomorphism. Finally, normative isomorphism refers to the values 
of the professional bodies and trade associations which lead firms and thus shape their 
organisational policies and practices.  
Drawing on these institutional isomorphisms of DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991), Scott 
(2001) refers to legitimisation as a distinct firm-specific motivation that can drive an organisation’s 
response to institutional pressure (see Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Scott argues that institutional 
pressures and organisational forces can interact with each other and shape organisational norms 
and practices. Oliver (1991) explains that firms can adopt, a ‘compromise’ strategy due to 
conflicting institutional demands or inconsistencies between institutional demands and internal 
organisational objectives. Compromise strategy is defined as an organisation balancing, pacifying 
or bargaining with external constituents. Haque and Ntim (2018) also argue that firms might 
conform to  the neo-institutional theory by adopting sustainable corporate strategies to comply 
with environmental policies and regulations in order to gain, maintain and repair organisational 
legitimacy. 
Institutional theory can explain the influence of institutional factors on firm-level 
initiatives. For example, institutional isomorphism can explain the influence of the GRI framework 
and the EU biodiversity strategic plan on corporate biodiversity disclosures. Firms tend to follow 
these institutional actors by adopting culturally acceptable social and environmental practices (e.g., 
‘mimetic and normative isomorphisms’ or mandatory reporting guidelines (e.g., ‘coercive 
isomorphism’). As Perez-Batres et al. (2012) argue, the adherence to GRI guidelines or UNGC 
codes provides a firm with the ‘normative pillar’ and ‘mimetic isomorphism’ to adopt sustainable 
social and environmental practices of global institutions, professional associations, and industry 
peers.  
Following Jones’s (1996, 2003) seminal work on the natural inventory model, several 
recent studies (e.g., Cuckston, 2013; Samkin et al., 2014; Siddiqui, 2013; Tregidga, 2013; Jones, 
2010; Boiral, 2016; Rimmel & Jonall, 2013; Gaia & Jones, 2017) examine biological assets and 
biodiversity accounting from a variety of perspectives. For example, Boiral and Hras-Saizarbitoria 
(2017a) argue that an organisation’s impact on biodiversity is likely to cause strong external 
pressures, which in turn damages an organisation’s reputation to operate within society. They then 
find biodiversity management initiatives of mining and forestry firms are driven by institutional 




collect and disclose data on natural assets to demonstrate their social obligations and to enhance 
their organisational legitimacy. Samkin et al. (2014) also argue that organisations are increasingly 
focusing on biodiversity related reporting to avoid tension with stakeholder groups and institutions.  
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) use resource-dependency theory to explain the resource 
provisioning role of the board of directors. Several recent studies (e.g., Mallin & Michelon, 2011; 
Ben-Amar et al., 2017; Hollindale et al., 2019) use this theory to explain the influence of corporate 
boards on social and environmental performance. Mallin and Michelon (2011) outline several 
reputational attributes that can promote sustainable corporate performance and corporate 
legitimacy. These include counselling and advice on critical issues such as climate change, 
corporate legitimacy, communications with external institutions and powerful stakeholders, and 
negotiations with suppliers and financiers for superior access to resources such as capital, 
technology and raw materials.   
From this perspective, resource dependency theory appears more appropriate than other 
related theories (e.g., agency theory) to address the impact of board gender diversity on firms’ 
biodiversity disclosures. The distinctive human and relational capital of female board members 
can shape a firm’s environmental strategies and performance, leading to greater efficiency, 
legitimacy and competitive advantage (see Hollindale et al., 2019).  
Altogether, contemporary literature highlights the significance of multiple theories in 
explaining corporate environmental practices, in general, and corporate biodiversity disclosures, 
in particular. Therefore, this study builds on  institutional and resource dependency theories to 
examine the effects of board gender diversity and its interactions with institutional forces (such as 
the GRI framework and the EU strategic plan for biodiversity) on a firm’s biodiversity disclosures.  
Figure 1 2  summarises the theoretical framework to explain individual and interactive 
effects of board gender diversity and two institutional variables on biodiversity disclosures.  
 
 





Figure 1: Summary of the theoretical framework 
 
2.2. Empirical literature and hypotheses development 
 
2.2.1. Board gender diversity   
Recent studies (such as, Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Haque, 2017) refer to several resource-
provisioning roles of female directors with respect to human and relational capital. These are 
critical in shaping a firm’s environmental strategy and performance and in mitigating the global 
environmental challenges such as GHG emissions and loss of biodiversity.   
Firstly, due to communal characteristics, female board members exhibit greater sensitivity 
towards relationship building and societal stakeholders’ concerns such as biodiversity risks. They 
therefore engage in sustainable corporate strategies and actions, and focus on long-term corporate 
performance indicators, in order to make a positive contribution to society and to environmental 
and sustainable development (Braun, 2010; Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Glass et al., 2016; Liao et 
al., 2015).  Secondly, female board members encourage open discussion, information sharing and 
greater participation, and thus, reduce the level of conflict in the board decision-making process 
and enhance high-quality board decisions, especially on climate and biodiversity issues (Nielsen 
& Huse, 2010; Bear et al., 2010). For Hollindale et al. (2019), female board members provide 
human capital through ‘value attunement’ and enhance a board’s understanding of the ethical and 
social demands of stakeholders, especially on  climate change.  
Board gender diversity can therefore bring critical advice and resources that can influence 
board decisions in adopting sustainable environmental policies and programmes and mitigate 
Institutional theory 
GRI framework; the EU 











global environmental challenges such as the loss of biodiversity. However, as Rao and Tilt (2016) 
and Galbreath (2011) observe, gender diversity might have a negative impact on board decision-
making processes due to a lack of consensus between groups and gender-based biases. Low et al. 
(2015) also suggest that both tokenism and stereotype threats tend to constrain female board 
members’ ability to perform successfully. Moreover, female board representation below a critical 
mass (e.g., at least three members) might not be able to influence a board’s strategic decision-
making process (Ben-Amar et al., 2017) 
Empirically, Glass et al. (2016) Liao et al. (2015) Mallin and Michelon (2011) and Ben-
Amar et al. (2017) find that board gender diversity positively influences sustainable corporate 
performance. Nonetheless, Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) find that board gender 
diversity does not influence carbon disclosures of S&P 500 firms. Moreover, Randøy et al. (2006) 
also show that board gender diversity does not have a statistically significant relationship with 
financial performance among the largest Scandinavian companies. Overall, there are mixed 
theoretical findings and empirical evidence.  
However, on balance we feel that the prior research supports the resource-provisioning role 
of female board members. We, therefore, overall expect a positive relationship between board 
gender diversity and biodiversity disclosures: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, gender diversity in corporate boards has a positive 
relationship with the firms’ disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (DBI) and biodiversity 
impact assessment (BIA). 
 
2.2.2. The EU (and UN) Biodiversity Strategic Plan and the GRI framework 
Organisations respond to institutional pressures, such as the Climate Change Act or the 
Kyoto Protocol by engaging in climate-related actions so as to gain corporate legitimacy (see, 
Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Comyns & Figge, 2015). This is broadly consistent with the notion of 
‘coercive isomorphism’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The United Nations Global Compact 
(UNGC) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) have developed a 
framework for corporate management to develop, implement and disclose biodiversity policies 
and practices, in order to reduce biodiversity risks, manage related impacts and seize opportunities 




companies in four broad-based areas of biodiversity and ecosystem services (i) review of the 
various risks and opportunities (ii)  integration of strategies into firms’ operations (iii) 
collaborations with stakeholders and business partners, and (iv) monitoring, evaluating and 
disclosing firms’ performance (UNGC, 2012, pp.5-6).  
Consequently, the EU Biodiversity Strategy 2011 was adopted with specific operational 
targets and action plans to be implemented from 2011-2010 (EC, 2015a). As part of this, the EU 
Business and Biodiversity Platform was established to integrate firm-specific biodiversity policies 
and operations through natural capital accounting, sector-specific guidelines on biodiversity, 
business opportunities, and innovations and biodiversity financing (EC, 2015a, 2015b). The EU 
Strategy also sets out guidelines for corporations to make a comprehensive assessment of the 
economic and social benefits of biodiversity and ecosystem and seeks to integrate these benefits 
into the corporate disclosure framework (EC, 2015a).  
The UK also showed a similar commitment towards the strategic plan for biodiversity 
(2011-2020)3 by undertaking the National Ecosystem Assessment (NEA) in 2011 in order to 
analyse economic, health and social values of diversity and ecosystem, and to develop strategies 
to halt the loss of biodiversity (JNCC & Defra, 2012). Therefore, we consider that both the EU 
biodiversity strategy and the UK National Ecosystem Assessment provide roughly similar 
institutional arrangements for firm-level biodiversity initiatives. Altogether, the UN and EU 
biodiversity strategies and action plans, although they are non-mandatory, tend to have a normative 
influence on firms. 
The GRI, being one of the most influential self-regulatory institutions, provides an 
intellectual framework for global sustainable development and sustainability reporting (Milne & 
Gray, 2013). The GRI (2007) framework facilitates biodiversity by encouraging managers to 
report five performance indicators covering a firm’s direct and indirect impacts on biodiversity, 
and firm-specific biodiversity strategies and action plans (pp.8-9). This framework has been 
instrumental in shaping sustainable organisational practices, establishing a ‘normative pillar’ 
(Scott, 2001) or moral base of organisational legitimacy, and enabling firms to demonstrate  
DiMaggio and Powell’s ‘mimetic isomorphism’ through imitating best practices of leading players 
in the industry (Milne & Gray, 2013; Perez-Batres et al., 2012).  
 




Empirically, Lokuwaduge and Heenetigala (2017) find that ESG reporting by Australian 
firms is highly influenced by GRI guidelines and listing regulations. Freedman and Jaggi (2011) 
report that corporate carbon disclosures in countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol (such as, 
Canada, Japan and EU countries) are more comprehensive than those of US firms, as the US did 
not ratify the Protocol. Tauringana and Chithambo (2015) show that the adoption of the DEFRA 
guidance enhances carbon disclosures of UK firms. Chang et al. (2015) also find similar evidence 
among Chinese firms.  
Other related studies suggest that firms might exhibit greater biodiversity disclosures and 
practices to enhance corporate legitimacy but without demonstrating actual performance in 
protecting biodiversity. Since all biodiversity disclosure is voluntary, companies do not have to 
follow either the UN or the EU strategies, or the GRI guidelines. Boiral (2016) observes that 
organisations use impression management techniques to defend their social legitimacy, without 
showing clear and measurable accounts of biodiversity. Boiral and Hras-Saizarbitoria (2017a; 
2017b) observe that it is difficult to find organisations that adopt comprehensive and substantial 
biodiversity practices, since there is a lack of external pressures or regulatory requirements. Jones 
(2003) also argues that companies might disclose selective biodiversity data without demonstrating 
better environmental management. Gaia and Jones (2017) show that UK local councils tend to 
adopt a pragmatic/instrumental approach4 in their biodiversity accounting and reporting practices. 
Haque and Ntim (2018) also find that firms respond to institutional pressures, such as the Climate 
Change Act symbolically by demonstrating superior carbon management performance rather than 
improving actual carbon performance. Moneva et al. (2006) also observe that GRI reporting helps 
firms to legitimise management decisions and actions, rather than demonstrating an improvement 
in critical sustainability indicators.  
Based on the above theoretical arguments and empirical evidences, we contend that 
corporations will tend to conform to the EU (and UN) biodiversity strategy and the GRI framework 
symbolically by demonstrating superior biodiversity related initiatives, instead of undertaking 
substantive biodiversity impact assessment. Thus, we develop the following hypothesis:  
 
 
4 According to an instrumental approach, “human beings can value biodiversity for its economic benefits, for its 
contribution in supporting life on Earth, for the pleasure, spiritual or aesthetic satisfaction they get from it, and so on 




Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, the EU 2020 Biodiversity Strategy and the GRI-
compliance are positively associated with biodiversity disclosures of a firm, and these 
relationships are stronger for the disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (DBI) than 
biodiversity impact assessment (BIA). 
 
Following our discussion of board gender diversity, female board members are likely to be 
proactive in complying with the EU (and UN) biodiversity strategic plan and the GRI’s 
biodiversity framework by providing critical advice and resources to enhance  biodiversity related 
disclosures. In other words, the EU Biodiversity Strategy and the GRI framework are likely to 
strengthen the positive relationship between board gender diversity and firms’ biodiversity 
disclosures. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, the EU2020 Biodiversity Strategy and the GRI framework 
reinforces a positive influence of board gender diversity on DBI and BIA.  
 
3. Research methodology  
 
3.1.  Data and sample 
This study is based on a panel dataset of 4,013 firm-year observations from listed 
companies in 13 European countries from 2002 to 2016. Unlike other biodiversity-related studies, 
our dataset captures a longer time span. We use the Thomson Reuters Asset4 database to collect 
corporate governance, biodiversity and other environmental, social and corporate governance 
related data, and the Worldscope database to gather financial data. We use panel regressions with 
country, time and industry fixed effects to analyse the disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (DBI) 
and logit regressions to explain biodiversity impact assessment (BIA). As we explain later, we 
measure DBI and BIA based on the biodiversity related data collected by the Thomson Reuters. 
The Worldscope database is also a part of the Thomson Reuters that provide comprehensive 
historical financial data on global public and private companies.  
Table 1 presents the country- and industry-specific breakdown of the sample. Our sample 
selection is based on the availability of biodiversity-related data from the Asset4 dataset. This 




corporate governance (ESG) issues (see also Trumpp et al., 2015). As shown in Table 1, our sample 
comprises 2,246 observations from the UK, and the remaining 1,767 observations from another 12 
European countries. The prime reason for the inclusion of so many UK firms in our sample is the 
availability of biodiversity-related data from the Asset4 dataset. We have included the UK with 
the other 12 European countries given our findings of a commonality in institutional arrangements 
between the EU biodiversity strategy and the UK National Ecosystem Assessment to assess and 
monitor firm-level disclosure of biodiversity initiatives. Table 1 also shows that our sample 
includes companies from 11 industrial sectors, with the services sector having the largest 
proportion of the sample (19.8%), followed by industrials (13.9%), construction (12.3%), and oil 
& gas 11.2%). In addition, utility and mining sectors comprise 6.0% and 5.6% of the sampled 
firms, respectively.  
 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
 
3.2.  Empirical model and variables 
We use univariate (e.g., t-tests), bivariate (e.g., correlations) and multivariate (fixed-effects 
and logit regressions) analyses to investigate the influence of board gender diversity on 
biodiversity disclosures. In order to analyse the disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (DBI), we use 
three-way fixed-effects regression by adopting the least square dummy variable (LSDV) model to 
control unobserved heterogeneity across countries, industries and time. Following related studies 
(e.g., Tauringana & Chithambo, 2015), we use fixed-effects regression models to investigate the 
effects of gender diversity, the GRI framework (GRI), and the EU 2020 biodiversity strategy on 
biodiversity disclosures. A fixed-effects model provides greater consistency and efficiency in 
estimations and offers more accurate inferences by controlling omitted variable problems and 
addressing the unobserved heterogeneity among the sampled firms over a period of time (see, 
Hsiao, 2007; Gallego-Alvarez et al., 2015).  
In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we develop the following empirical model: 
 
DBIit = β0 + β1Diversityit + β2GRIit + β3Bio2020it + β4B.Sizeit + β5B.Expit + β6Connectionsit 
+ β7Independenceit + β8Separationit + β9ESGit + β10CSRit + β11EMSit + β12Qit + β13Sizeit + 




β19IIntensityit+ β20Capexit + β21Growthit + β22Countryi + β23Industryi + β24Year + uit   
         (1)  
 
In the Equation, DBI is a function of board gender diversity (diversity), GRI framework 
(GRI), the 2020 EU biodiversity strategy (Bio2020), ESG-related control variables, financial 
characteristics and the error term u. This model also includes country, industry and time dummy 
variables. In order to avoid multicollinearity problems in using individual and interactive variables 
in a single regression, we follow, among others, Morse et al. (2011) and Cordeiro and Sarkis (2008) 
in testing Hypothesis 2a by using each moderating variable to split the sample into two and run 
regression. Therefore, we estimate Equation (1) for two sub-samples of GRI-compliant and non-
compliant firms, and for two sub-samples covering post-biodiversity strategy period (2011-2016) 
and pre-strategy period (2002-2010). 
We follow several related studies (e.g., Bhattacharyya & Cummings, 2015; Boiral & Hras-
Saizarbitoria, 2017b) in using an overall measure of biodiversity related policies, procedures, and 
activities, as disclosed by the sampled firms and compiled by Thomson Reuters. This is referred 
to as the disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (DBI) score, with higher DBI indicating greater 
disclosure of biodiversity-related initiatives of a firm. The DBI score is based on eight indicators 
of biodiversity policies, processes, restoration or protection, reduction of impact, toxic chemicals, 
hazardous waste or wastewater, land use, and management monitoring (see dependent variables in 
Table 2). We examine the environment (emission reduction) related indicators of the Asset4 
database to identify and collect those indicators  disclosing biodiversity initiatives. These are based 
on disclosures of biodiversity related policies, processes and initiatives to protect its native 
ecosystem or biodiversity and minimise the adverse effects of a firm’s operations on biodiversity. 
These indicators are broadly in line with the GRI’s biodiversity performance indicators covering 
a firm’s impacts on biodiversity, together with firm-specific strategies and actions to mitigate 
negative impacts and to enhance positive impacts (GRI, 2007). 
 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
 
Biodiversity impact assessment (BIA) is a more explicit measure of biodiversity. We re-




engagement in monitoring its impacts on biodiversity through the usage of balanced scorecard or 
key performance indicators (KPIs). Since BIA is a dummy variable, we follow, among others, 
Matsumura et al. (2014) in using a logit regression model. BIA does not necessarily mean that a 
firm actually monitors its biodiversity performance by using KPIs, as we rely on a firm’s disclosure 
to measure this variable. 
Table 2 outlines the details of DBI and BIA, alongside other variables of the empirical 
model. We outline three independent variables (board gender diversity, GRI and Bio2020). We 
measure board gender diversity as the percentage of female board members (Diversity), and we 
expect this  to be positively related to biodiversity disclosures. GRI is a dummy variable that 
measures if a firm discloses its compliance with the GRI framework in publishing its sustainability 
report. We use the Thomson Reuters Asset4 database to collect data for DBI, BIA and GRI. We 
also use Bio2020 as a dummy institutional variable that equals 1 if the observation captures the 
time period from 2011 to 2016, and 0 otherwise. This is intended to examine if the European 
Commission’s adoption of the biodiversity strategy in 2011 shows any positive impact on firms’ 
biodiversity disclosures. We predict that both GRI and Bio2010 will show a positive association 
with a firm’s biodiversity disclosures, and we expect that this relationship is greater for 
biodiversity initiatives (DBI) than for biodiversity impact assessment (BIA). 
We follow related studies (such as de Villiers et al., 2011; Haque, 2017) in using several 
governance-related control variables, which include board experience (B.exp), board connections 
(Connections), board size (B.size), board independence (Independence), and CEO-Chair 
separation (Separation) (see Table 2).  
From the perspective of resource dependency theory, board experience and connections 
can facilitate a firm’s access to critical advice and external resources. This can help a firm to  
engage in sustainability initiatives (see, Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2012). A large board tends to 
suffer from free-rider problems and conflicting views in board decisions, which causes poor 
environmental disclosures (see, Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). A more independent 
board is likely to influence executive management to improve social and environmental 
performance (see Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012).  
We also use a number of stakeholder-oriented measures that might drive a firm’s 
biodiversity disclosures. These include, CSR committee of the board , ESG-oriented remuneration 




measures are predicted to have a positive association with biodiversity indicators (Peters & Romi, 
2014; Haque, 2017).  We also use several financial characteristics as control variables by following 
related empirical studies (e.g., de Villiers et al., 2011). These include firm size, profitability, 
financial slack, leverage, firm value (Tobin’s Q5), number of shareholders, number of employees, 
capital expenditure, capital intensive assets and growth prospects (see financial control variables 
in Table 2). We use the Worldscope database to collect data for these financial control variables. 
Finally, our regression models include country, industry and year dummy variables to control for 
country- industry- and time-specific influences in our estimation results. 
 
4. Empirical results  
 
4.1.  Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis  
Table 3 shows summary statistics of the variables. It shows that the mean value of the DBI 
score is 2.91 with a standard deviation of 1.95, on a scale of 0 to 8. The disclosure of biodiversity 
initiatives of the sampled firms therefore seems quite low although there is no set benchmark on 
this in the absence of comparable studies. However, a relatively high standard deviation indicates 
that the DBI values of firms are quite spread out from the mean value. The table also shows that 
only around 0.03 or 3% of the sampled firms tend to adopt biodiversity impact assessment (BIA). 
This suggests that an exceptionally large majority of firms do not demonstrate substantial 
engagement in monitoring their impacts and actions on biodiversity through key performance 
indicators or a balanced scorecard. As we discuss later, this supports the arguments and evidences 
of Bioral (2016) and Gaia and Jones (2017) in relation to impression management and an 
instrumental approach to corporate biodiversity disclosures.  
 
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
 
Table 3 further shows that the percentage of female directors is around 14%, with a 
standard deviation of 12.29, suggesting a wide variation of female board members’ representation 
among the sampled firms. This suggests that the female board representation in European firms is 
 





relatively higher than that of the UK firms. This trend is consistent with our country-specific 
estimation of mean values of gender diversity, which we show in Table 4 (also see below). In 
addition, the mean value of GRI (a dummy variable) indicates that 65% of the sampled firms 
disclosed that they have adopted the GRI-framework in preparing corporate sustainability reports.  
Moreover, 50% of the total observations fall under the post-biodiversity strategy period from 2011 
and 2016.  
Below we highlight the most common governance related control variables (board size and 
independence) plus the three most common sustainability-oriented control variables (ESG, CSR, 
EMS). We find that the sampled firms have an average of around nine board members (as the 
natural logarithm of mean board size is 2.23), and that around 52% of the board members are 
independent. This is comparable with the evidence of Tauringana and Chithambo (2015). Table 3 
further shows that 68% of the sampled firms adopt ISO 14001 environmental management system, 
63% of the firms maintain CSR committee of the board, and around 33% of the firms have an 
ESG-based compensation policy. Among the financial indicators, we then report some of the 
important control variables including firm value (Tobin’s Q), profitability, leverage, capex, and 
growth.  
  
***Insert Table 4 about here*** 
 
Table 4 shows the mean values of DBI, BIA and gender diversity across countries and 
industries. It is evident that firms in Italy and France demonstrate the greatest disclosure of 
biodiversity initiatives (DBI), followed by Spain, Austria, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Finland, 
Germany and UK. In terms of board gender diversity, Scandinavian countries play a leading role, 
with firms in Norway having the highest proportion of female board members (31.77%), followed 
by Sweden (24.59%), Finland (21.75%), and Denmark (14.13%). Surprisingly, firms of these 
Scandinavian countries do not seem to show greater activism in biodiversity protection initiatives 
compared to firms from other EU countries, with the mean Danish values of DBI and BIA being 
the lowest among the sampled countries. Whilst Norwegian firms have the highest degree of board 
gender diversity, their biodiversity disclosure is below the total average, whereas Italian firms 
show the best biodiversity disclosure with a moderate degree of gender diversity. Moreover, firms 




a relatively low gender diversity. This evidence of Scandinavian firms having greater gender 
diversity and poorer biodiversity disclosure tend to contradict our hypothesised positive 
relationship between board gender diversity and biodiversity disclosures. Overall, Southern 
European countries such as Italy and Spain and several Central European countries such as France, 
Austria and Netherlands exhibit greater disclosure of biodiversity initiatives. As we explain later, 
the UK firms demonstrate relatively lower biodiversity disclosures and board gender diversity than 
a majority of its European counterparts. 
Table 4 also shows that the polluting industries have the highest levels of DBI and BIA. 
The utility-sector (gas, water and electricity) firms demonstrate the greatest biodiversity 
disclosure, followed by mining, construction materials, oil & gas, and food producers. Table 4 also 
shows that these industries tend to have relatively high board gender diversity with the proportion 
of female board members ranging from 12.9% in the construction sector to 14.4% in the oil & gas 
sector, although mining is much lower at 10.0%. Overall, , the retail sector has the highest level of 
board gender diversity (16.5%), followed by food producers (14.9%). 
Table 5 presents t-test results to show the differences in mean values of DBI and BIA 
between five different categories: GRI and non-GRI compliant firms; pre-and post-Biodiversity 
strategy 2020 periods; firms with and without board gender diversity; biodiversity sensitive (e.g., 
polluting) and insensitive industries; and UK and EU. All five categories show a 1% statistical 
significance level. GRI-compliant firms exhibit greater DBI and BIA than the non-GRI compliant 
firms supporting the findings of Lokuwaduge and Heenetigala (2017) that GRI enhances 
sustainable corporate reporting. Panel B also shows that firms demonstrate statistically greater 
disclosure for both biodiversity indicators after the adoption of the EU biodiversity strategy in 
2011. Our evidence corroborates related studies (e.g., Chang et al., 2015; Freedman & Jaggi, 2011) 
that show a positive influence of the Kyoto Protocol and environmental policy on environmental 
disclosures and performance. This is also comparable with the evidence of Gaia and Jones (2017) 
in relation to a positive effect of the International Year of Biodiversity on biodiversity disclosures 
of UK firm. 
 





Panel C shows statistically significant evidence that companies with at least one female 
director exhibit greater biodiversity disclosure than their counterparts in terms of both DBI and 
BIA confirming Hypothesis 1. Moreover, Panel D demonstrates that biodiversity sensitive or 
polluting industries (such as utilities, mining, construction materials, oil & gas, and industrials) 
show a statistically significant improvement in biodiversity disclosure compared to other 
industries. This evidence broadly supports institutional theory that polluting firms come under 
closer scrutiny from the various institutions and stakeholders, and hence, they demonstrate greater 
biodiversity disclosure to maintain or enhance corporate legitimacy. Finally, Panel E shows that  
European firms have more statistically significant DBI and BIA disclosures than the UK firms. 
This evidence indicates that the UK’s National Ecosystem Assessment (NEA) and biodiversity 
working group appear to show little success in monitoring and improving a firm’s biodiversity 
obligations, activities and disclosures.  
 
***Insert Table 6 about here*** 
 
Table 6 shows bivariate correlations among the biodiversity measures and some important 
variables. It is evident that DBI has a moderate positive correlation with board gender diversity 
(diversity), GRI-framework (GRI), and EU biodiversity strategy (Bio2020), with the correlation 
coefficients ranging from 0.25 to 0.56. BIA maintains a weaker relationship with these variables. 
This might be due to the reluctance of a sizable proportion of the sampled firms to use balanced 
scorecards to trace biodiversity impact and progress. Overall, these correlation results are broadly 
in line with our Hypotheses 1 and 2. We also compute correlations among all independent and 
control variables. The lower correlations values indicate that there is no multicollinearity problem.  
Overall, our univariate and bivariate results are supportive of the main hypotheses with 
respect to a positive relationship between independent variables (such as gender diversity, GRI 
framework and the EU biodiversity strategy) and corporate biodiversity disclosures.  
 
***Insert Table 7 about here*** 
 




Table 7 shows the results of three-way fixed-effects regressions of the disclosure of 
biodiversity initiatives (DBI) against three independent variables (e.g., board gender diversity, GRI 
framework, the EU biodiversity 2020 strategy) and all control variables specified in Equation (1). 
Column 1 shows the regression results for the whole sample: Diversity, GRI and Bio2020 have 
positive associations with DBI, and these relationships are significant at the 1% level.  
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 show estimation results of Equation (1) for the sub-samples of 
GRI-compliant and GRI non-compliant firms, respectively. We find that board gender diversity is 
positively associated with DBI in both sub-samples, and is higher for the GRI-compliant  than the 
non-compliant firms. In addition, Bio2020 shows positive association with DBI only among the 
GRI non-compliant firms. This implies that the GRI non-compliant firms appear to have responded 
to the EU strategy by improving their disclosures of biodiversity initiatives. This might be because 
a group of firms tend to exhibit greater engagement in biodiversity issues by voluntarily complying 
with both the GRI guidelines and the biodiversity strategy to enhance corporate legitimacy. 
Columns 4 and 5 show estimation results of Equation (1) for the sub-samples of post-biodiversity 
strategy period (2011-2016) and pre-strategy period (2002-2010), respectively. It is evident that 
board gender diversity has a positive relationship with DBI with the relationship being slightly 
higher during the post-strategy period than in the pre-strategy period. In addition, GRI shows a 
positive association with DBI in both sub-samples.  
Among the control variables, board CSR committee, firm size and intensity largely 
maintain positive relationships with DBI in all the estimations. Table 7 further shows that ESG-
based compensation policy (ESG), ISO14001 environmental management system (EMS) and 
board independence show a positive relationship with DBI among the whole sample and the sub-
samples of GRI non-compliant firms and pre-strategy period.  
To measure the effects of board gender diversity, GRI framework, the EU biodiversity 
strategy on biodiversity impact assessment (BIA), we ran logit regressions by replacing DBI with 
BIA in the Equation. Table 8 shows the results of the regressions of BIA against three independent 
and all control variables. Column 1 shows that both diversity and GRI have statistically significant 
positive relationships with BIA, as expected. However, Bio2020 shows a negative relationship 
with BIA. Columns 2 and 3 show estimation results for BIA for the sub-samples of GRI-compliant 
and non-compliant firms, respectively. As predicted, diversity shows highly significant positive 




negative association with BIA only among the GRI-compliant firms. Columns 4 and 5 show that 
diversity has a positive relationship with BIA during the post-strategy period, as predicted. 
Moreover, GRI maintains positive relationship with BIA during the pre-strategy period.  
Altogether, these results imply that the GRI and the EU Biodiversity strategy tend to 
reinforce the positive influence of board gender diversity on BIA. In other words, female board 
members seem to respond to these institutional factors by encouraging firms to monitor their 
biodiversity impacts. The negative relationship between Bio2020 and BIA for the whole sample 
and for the GRI-compliant firms seems surprising. This might be because GRI-compliant firms 
are reluctant to comply with specific EU guidelines to measure biodiversity impact assessment. 
They therefore show more biodiversity initiative disclosures and less biodiversity impact 
assessments.  They seem to indulge in biodiversity impression management by stressing their 
biodiversity actions, but not disclosing their impacts.  
Among sustainability oriented control variables, only EMS maintain a largely positive 
relationship with BIA, indicating that firms that have adopted EMS are more likely to adopt 
biodiversity impact assessment. Among the financial control variables, financial slack shows an 
inverse association with BIA, implying that firms with less available cash are less likely to adopt 
BIA.  
 
***Insert Table 8 about here*** 
 
Robustness tests 
We carried out three robustness tests. a firm fixed-effects model, an alternative gender 
diversity variable and re-estimated Equation (1) by introducing variables one by one. In all three 
cases, we found no noticeable differences in our overall findings.   
Finally, we tried to measure the impact of a variable that captures the adverse outcome on 
biodiversity. We, therefore, used the disclosure of environmental violation incidents as an 
additional independent variable in our regression estimations. This is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the sampled firms report environmental violation incidents, and 0 otherwise. Our estimation 
results (not reported) suggest that this new variable is statistically insignificant (t = 0.53, p >0.10). 
We also find that only 56 out of 4013 observations have environmental violation incidents, 




violations. This evidence is in line with our overall arguments that firms tend to follow biodiversity 
impression management techniques by focusing on symbolic disclosures rather than disclosing the 
adverse impact of their activities.  
 
5. Discussion 
Overall, our estimation results confirm Hypothesis 1 that boards with greater female 
representation have a positive relationship with both firm biodiversity indicators (e.g., DBI and 
BIA). This evidence is consistent with several recent empirical studies (e.g., Hollindale et al., 
2019; Mallin & Michelon, 2011; Glass et al., 2016; Bear et al., 2010) that reveal a significant 
positive influence of board gender diversity on corporate social and environmental strategies, 
disclosures and performance. This evidence also corroborates the resource provisioning role of 
female directors. They can provide human and relational capital to influence and facilitate 
sustainable corporate actions (see also, Hollindale et al., 2019, Mallin & Michelon, 2011).  
Our estimation results (shown in Tables 7 and 8) further suggest that the GRI framework 
and the EU strategic plan on biodiversity (2011-2020) have positive associations with DBI, but 
their relationship with BIA appears inconclusive. This supports Hypothesis 2a that the biodiversity 
strategy and the GRI framework have positive relationships with biodiversity disclosures, and 
these relationships are stronger for the disclosure of biodiversity initiatives than for biodiversity 
impact assessment. This evidence tends to corroborate the evidence of the related literature (such 
as, Isaksson & Steimle, 2009; Moneva et al., 2006; Haque & Ntim, 2018) in that the symbolic 
adherence to the GRI guidelines might help firms to legitimise management decisions and actions. 
However, it does not necessarily reflect an improvement in substantive or actual biodiversity 
performance. This might be due to the weak GRI framework and EU strategic plans that promote 
voluntary disclosure rather than mandatory requirements to demonstrate actual biodiversity 
performance or progress. (see also, Boiral & Hras-Saizarbitoria, 2017a; 2017b). Our results also 
support the evidence of Gaia and Jones (2017), who find that the UK local councils’ declaration 
of 2010 as the International Year of Biodiversity has a positive effect on biodiversity disclosures, 
even though these disclosures focus more on human welfare ecology and resource conservation, 
and less on environmental stewardship and ecocentric philosophies. This is broadly in line with a 




This is primarily intended to protect and/or enhance environmental legitimacy and promote 
commercial interests using impression management techniques (Boiral, 2016).  
One notable aspect of our estimation results is that the degree of disclosures of biodiversity 
initiatives and biodiversity impact assessment is reasonably low, although there is no set 
benchmark to compare our results. Surprisingly only around 3% of the sampled firms adopt 
biodiversity impact assessment (BIA) or balanced scorecards to measure a firm’s impact on (or 
improvement in) biodiversity. This percentage is, however, slightly higher after the adoption of 
the EU strategic plan in 2011 (4%), and for firms that adopt the GRI framework (around 4%), as 
shown in Table 5. This approach can be referred to as a ‘strategic planning’ phase, rather than as 
performance/implementation’ and ‘evaluation’ phases, as outlined in the biodiversity framework 
of Samkin et al. (2014). Boiral (2016) finds that firms demonstrate symbolic commitments and 
successful rhetoric, rather than clear and measurable accounts, in their biodiversity reports. One 
possible interpretation is that good disclosure of biodiversity initiatives does not assess their actual 
impacts (e.g., BIA).  
Our regression results (in Table 7) indicate that board gender diversity has a positive 
relationship with DBI, and that this relationship is higher among GRI-compliant firms and for the 
post-Biodiversity strategy period. Moreover, as Table 8 shows, board gender diversity is found to 
be positively related to BIA for the whole sample but only among GRI-compliant firms and for 
the post-Biodiversity strategy period. This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2b, implying 
that the GRI and the EU 2020 biodiversity strategy reinforce the positive influence of board gender 
diversity on a firm’s biodiversity disclosures. Overall, this suggests that female board members 
promote corporate sustainability and influence a board’s decision by providing critical advice and 
resources on biodiversity policies and programmes. Moreover, they also remain proactive in 
responding to normative or mimetic isomorphisms of institutional factors such as the GRI and the 
EU (and UN) biodiversity strategy.  
Nevertheless, given the poor overall biodiversity disclosures and firms’ symbolic 
compliance with the institutional factors, critics might argue that board gender diversity enhances 
corporate hypocrisy by influencing firms to engage in biodiversity initiatives symbolically rather 
than substantially. Moreover, as our descriptive statistics (in Table 4) show,  Scandinavian firms 
exhibit greater board gender diversity and poorer overall biodiversity disclosures than  firms from 




relationship between board gender diversity and biodiversity disclosures. Our descriptive statistics 
also indicate that several Southern European countries (e.g., Italy and Spain) and several Central 
European countries (e.g., France, Netherlands and Austria) demonstrate an improved biodiversity 
disclosure. However,  overall biodiversity disclosure of the UK firms is relatively lower than that 
of a majority of its European counterparts. We also find that organisations representing the 
polluting industries (e.g., utility, mining, construction materials, oil & gas) tend to exhibit 
improved disclosures for both indicators of biodiversity. This evidence is largely supportive of the 
legitimisation aspect of the institutional theory. 
Altogether, our evidence supports an integrated framework of institutional and resource 
dependency theories. Firstly, a group of firms might have appointed more female board members 
as part of their compliance with regulatory requirements in several countries (such as France, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden), and this can be considered as coercive isomorphism. Moreover, another 
group of firms might have been driven by normative isomorphism in promoting board gender 
diversity due to a contemporary shift in professional values surrounding the role of females in 
society. Similarly, as we argued in the literature review, firms’ decisions to comply with the GRI 
guidelines or the EU and UN biodiversity strategy seem to conform the coercive, normative or 
mimetic isomorphisms. This results of growing pressures from regulators, professional bodies, 
industry peers and other stakeholders to demonstrate greater activism on sustainability. Secondly, 
a board with greater gender diversity recognises global and local institutions’ concerns (such as 
GRI and EU regulators) about the long-term consequences of a firm’s actions on biodiversity. 
Thirdly, female board members influence board decisions to improve the disclosures of 
biodiversity initiatives a firm, and provide critical advice and resources to implement those 
initiatives.   
Among the sustainability-oriented control variables, ISO14001 environmental 
management system, and ESG-based compensation policy maintain a positive association with 
both DBI and BIA for the whole sample, although these relationships are inconsistent for sub-
samples. In addition, the CSR committee maintains a positive association with DBI. These results 
are broadly consistent with the predictions of the institutional theory that firms tend to follow 
mimetic or normative isomorphisms by adopting sustainable environmental practices, which 
enhance a firm’s biodiversity disclosures. This evidence also supports Rankin et al. (2011) and 




disclosures of Australian firms, and the sustainable compensation policy and carbon performance 
of UK companies. Moreover, board independence and board size show a positive relationship with 
DBI, rather than BIA, even though these results are inconsistent for the sub-samples. The evidence 
is broadly comparable with de Villiers et al. (2011) and Liao et al. (2015), as both studies report 
similar results in the context of US firms’ environmental performance and UK firms’ GHG 
disclosures, respectively. 
Among the financial control variables, capital intensity largely maintains a positive 
relationship, whereas financial slack shows a negative relationship, with both biodiversity 
indicators. This is also consistent with the theoretical arguments that firms with higher capital-
intensive assets can enhance energy efficiency, leading to an improved biodiversity disclosure 
(see, Luo et al., 2012). However, de Villiers et al. (2011) find a negative relationship between 
capital intensity and environmental activism of US companies. Their results might be driven by 
the difference in sample (e.g., US firms), together with a limited period of data coverage (2003 
and 2004). Our results also suggest that that firms with less free cash flows are less likely to 
disclose biodiversity initiatives and biodiversity impact assessment. Moreover, leverage shows a 
negative relationship, and firm size shows a positive relationship, with DBI, rather than BIA. Our 
evidence on leverage is consistent with the arguments that a levered firm is unlikely to show greater 
commitment to climate-related initiatives due to its short-term focus on operations and investment, 
and an obligation to pay interest (see Haque, 2017). Our evidence also suggests that large firms 




This study examined how firm-specific governance characteristics (e.g., board gender 
diversity) and institutional factors (e.g., the Global Reporting Initiative and the EU 2020 strategic 
plan for biodiversity) individually and interactively influence two firm biodiversity performance 
indicators: disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (DBI) and biodiversity impact assessment (BIA). 
We used three-way fixed-effects regressions and logistic regression models to analyse data on 
4,013 firm-year observations from European listed companies from 2002-2016.  
Overall, our estimation results suggest that board gender diversity is positively associated 




and the EU 2020 biodiversity strategy. These results indicate that boards with greater gender 
diversity show greater sensitivity towards the legitimate concerns of institutions and societal 
stakeholders such as the GRI framework and the EU biodiversity Strategy. Gender diverse boards 
tend to be more proactive in disclosing biodiversity initiatives of a firm, supporting these initiatives 
by counselling, greater participation and lower conflict in the board decision-making process, and 
sharing information with stakeholders. This eventually mitigates the biodiversity-related risks of 
a firm and enhances corporate legitimacy. However, given the relatively low degree of overall 
biodiversity disclosures, critics might argue that board gender diversity tends to support corporate 
hypocrisy by influencing firms to engage in impression management.  
Our results further suggest that the GRI guidelines and the EU 2020 biodiversity strategy 
tend to enhance the disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (such as biodiversity policies, processes 
and disclosures), but do not seem to persuade firms to report  their impacts on biodiversity. This 
indicates a more symbolic, rather than a substantive engagement with biodiversity initiatives, and 
thus supports the legitimisation aspect of the institutional theory.  
Moreover, we find a poor overall biodiversity disclosure of the sampled firms for both DBI 
and BIA. Our descriptive statistics also suggest that firms from several Southern European 
countries (e.g., Italy and Spain) and several Central European countries (e.g., France, Netherlands 
and Austria) demonstrate greater biodiversity disclosures than Scandinavian and UK firms. In 
addition, our t-test results show that (non-UK) European firms as a whole show greater biodiversity 
disclosure than the UK firms. We also find that biodiversity sensitive or polluting industries 
demonstrate an improved biodiversity disclosure than other industries. 
Altogether, our evidence supports both the institutional theory and resource dependency 
theory. On the one hand, good corporate governance and sustainability practices of a firm such as 
the appointment of female board members, the adoption of GRI-based biodiversity reporting 
guidelines and the compliance with the EU biodiversity strategy, are consistent with coercive as 
well as normative or mimetic isomorphisms of the institutional theory. On the other hand, female 
board members can play a resource-provisioning role by introducing unique human and relational 
capital and thus improve the disclosure of biodiversity initiatives and biodiversity impact 
assessment of a firm. These good corporate governance and sustainability practices enhance 




Our evidence has several policy implications. First, our results confirm the significance of 
an integrated framework of gender diversity and biodiversity. This has been advocated by the CBD 
and the IUCN. In other words, board gender diversity tends to exert influence in promoting the 
disclosure of biodiversity initiatives such as the management and conservation of biodiversity. 
Second, our evidence suggests an interactive effect of gender diversity and institutional factors 
such as GRI framework and the EU 2020 reinforcing the positive effect of board gender diversity 
on DBI and BIA. This suggests an interdependence between internal corporate governance factors 
and external institutional factors. Hence, policymakers could enhance an alignment between 
gender-specific corporate governance reform and sustainable environmental regulations to combat 
biodiversity losses. This can be done, among other things, by setting out regulations to increase 
female representation in firms’ boards, Third, our inconclusive results of the effects of GRI and 
Bio2020 on BIA, together with the poor overall biodiversity disclosure, suggest that the adoption 
of voluntary reporting guidelines such as GRI or a generic biodiversity strategic plan (such as the 
EU 2020 strategy) are unlikely to influence firms to improve biodiversity disclosures or have 
substantial engagements with biodiversity initiatives. Therefore, policymakers should enact 
mandatory regulations on biodiversity with explicit industry-and firm-specific guidelines and 
verifiable sustainable targets on biodiversity initiatives, their impacts and improvements. 
One of the caveats of this study is that we used self-reported environmental violation 
incidents as an additional independent variable in our robustness tests, but this indicator might not 
indicate actual environmental violations. Therefore, future studies can use an external source of 
data for this variable in order to triangulate this with the self-reported data. Second, future research 
can compare shareholder-based corporate governance systems (such as the US, UK and Australia) 
with stakeholder-based systems (such as Continental Europe and Japan). Third, future studies 
might consider in-depth case studies and interviews with board members, executives, shareholders, 
and other stakeholders to examine their views on corporate biodiversity initiatives. Fourth, given 
that our descriptive statistics on Scandinavian countries are surprisingly contradictory to the 
hypothesised positive association between gender diversity and biodiversity disclosures, future 
researchers can undertake an in-depth analysis or a mixed methods approach to address this topic 
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Distribution of sample based on country and industry  
Country Obs Percent Industry Obs Percent 
Austria 62 1.54 Aerospace & Defence 204 5.08 
Belgium 44 1.10 Construction Materials 493 12.29 
Denmark 96 2.39 Food producers 254 6.33 
Finland 171 4.26 Utilities 242 6.03 
France 287 7.15 Healthcare 309 7.70 
Germany 187 4.66 IT&Electronics 156 3.89 
Italy 66 1.64 Industrials 558 13.90 
Netherlands 142 3.54 Mining 225 5.61 
Norway 122 3.04 Oil&Gas 450 11.21 
Spain 151 3.76 Retailers 326 8.12 
Sweden 170 4.24 Services 796 19.84 
Switzerland 269 6.70    
UK 2246 55.97    









DBI A DBI score is based on the sum of eight dummy variables representing a 
firm’s disclosure of biodiversity initiatives as disclosed by the sampled 
firms and compiled by Thomson Reuters. These are biodiversity policies 
and processes, restoration or protection of biodiversity, reduction of impact, 
reduction of toxic chemicals, recycling of hazardous waste or wastewater, 




BIA A dummy variable: 1 if the company monitors its impacts on biodiversity 
through the balanced scorecard or key performance indicators (KPI), and 0 








GRI reporting GRI A dummy variable: 1 if the firm complies with the GRI guidelines in 
publishing the sustainability report and 0 otherwise. 
EU Biodiversity 
Strategy 2020 
Bio2020 A dummy variable: 1 if the observation captures the time period from 2011 
to 2016, and 0 otherwise. 
ESG-related Control variables 
Board size B.size Natural logarithm of the number of board of directors 
Board experience B.exp Natural logarithm of the average tenure of the board of directors 
Board affiliation Connections Natural logarithm of the average corporate affiliations of board of directors 
Board 
independence 
Independence Percentage of independent board members 
CEO-Chair 
separation 
Separation A dummy variable: 1 if the CEO and board chairperson are two different 
individuals, and 0 otherwise 
ESG-based 
compensation 
ESG A dummy variable: 1 if the firm adopts a sustainability oriented 
compensation policy and 0 otherwise 





EMS A dummy variable: 1 if the firm has adopted an ISO14001 certified 
environmental management system, and 0 otherwise. 
Financial control variables 
Firm value Tobin’s Q Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity 
to total assets. 
Firm size  Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Return on Assets Profitability The ratio of net income to the average of last year's and current year’s 
total assets * 100 
 
Leverage Leverage Total debt to total assets  
Employees Employees Natural logarithm of the number of employees. 
Shareholders  Shareholders Natural logarithm of the number of shareholders. 
Slack Slack Total cash and equivalents over total assets. 
Capital intensity Intensity The ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets.  
Capital 
expenditure 
Capex Total capital expenditure divided by total sales. 







Descriptive statistics  
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dep. variables:       
DBI (Score) 4013 2.91 1.95 0.00 8.00 
BIA  4013 0.03 0.02 0.00 1.00 
Ind. variables:      
Diversity (%) 4013 14.12 12.29 0.00 66.67 
GRI  4013 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Bio2020  4013 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
ESG-related control variables      
B.size (Ln) 4013 2.23 1.60 1.99 3.22 
B.exp (Ln) 4013 1.72 0.44 -2.53 3.08 
Connections (Ln) 4013 0.27 0.77 -2.81 2.84 
Independence (%) 4013 52.32 24.30 0.00 100 
Separation 4013 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00 
ESG  4013 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
CSR  4013 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 
EMS  4013 0.68 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Financial control variables:      
Tobin’s Q 4013 0.93 0.59 0.03 8.45 
Size (Ln) 4013 15.41 1.60 8.01 19.98 
Profitability (%) 4013 6.84 8.90 -116.48 106.82 
Leverage 4013 24.26 16.34 0.00 126.12 
Employees (Ln of n) 4013 7.69 0.97 1.10 8.67 
Shareholders (Ln of n) 4013 12.46 1.45 4.91 17.09 
Slack 4013 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.93 
Intensity  4013 0.58 0.39 0.00 3.14 
Capex 4013 7.64 14.90 0.00 266.85 
Growth  4013 462.75 245.25 1.00 1123.00 






Mean values of important variables across countries and industries 
Country DBI BIA Diversity Industry DBI BIA Diversity 
Austria 3.33 0.05 7.13 Aerospace & Defense 2.92 0.00 9.89 
Belgium 2.42 0.04 11.38 Construction Materials 3.68 0.07 12.95 
Denmark 1.98 0.00 14.13 Food producers 2.60 0.03 14.91 
Finland 2.90 0.01 21.75 Utilities 4.49 0.09 13.67 
France 4.23 0.00 16.75 Healthcare 2.29 0.01 13.57 
Germany 2.85 0.02 9.81 IT&Electronics 1.62 0.00 8.71 
Italy 4.33 0.17 10.66 Industrials 2.53 0.01 13.53 
Netherlands 3.28 0.01 11.75 Mining 4.01 0.06 9.98 
Norway 2.31 0.01 31.77 Oil&Gas 3.08 0.03 14.43 
Spain 3.62 0.08 10.20 Retailers 2.23 0.01 16.47 
Sweden 2.92 0.05 24.59 Services 1.83 0.01 11.70 
Switzerland 2.01 0.04 7.67         
UK 2.48 0.02 11.49         






Table 5  
T-test results showing the variations in disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (DBI) and biodiversity 
impact assessment (BIA) across several categories of sub-samples.    
Variables  Sample Mean Difference t-statistics 
Pr(T > t) 
(HA: diff > 0) 
Panel A: GRI and non-GRI compliant firms: 
DBI 
GRI=1 2258 3.05 
0.67*** 12.61 0.000 
GRI=0 3410 2.38 
BIA 
GRI=1 2280 0.04 
0.02*** 5.34 0.000 
GRI=0 3416 0.01 
Panel B: Pre- and post-Bio2020 Strategy periods: 
DBI 
Post-Bio2020 2436 3.35 
0.99*** 19.15 0.000 
Pre- Bio2020 3232 2.35 
BIA 
Post- Bio2020 2448 0.04 
0.02*** 5.34 0.000 
Pre- Bio2020 3248 0.02 
Panel C: Firms with and without board gender diversity: 
DBI FemDir=1 3802 3.19 1.22*** 22.63 0.000 
FemDir=0 1855 1.96 
BIA FemDir=1 3824 0.04 0.03*** 5.87 0.000 
FemDir=0 1861 0.01 
Panel D: Biodiversity-sensitive and biodiversity-insensitive industries: 
DBI Bio-sensitive ind 2897 3.34 1.15*** 22.70 0.000 
Bio-insensitive ind 2771 2.19 
BIA Bio-sensitive ind 2923 0.04 0.05*** 7.94 0.000 
Bio-insensitive ind 2773 0.01 
Panel E: UK and other European countries: 
DBI EU 2930 3.06 0.58*** 11.08 0.000 
UK 2766 2.45 
BIA EU 2930 0.04 0.02*** 4.12 0.000 
UK 2766 0.02 
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level.  GRI=1 indicates GRI-compliant firms that publish sustainability 
reports based on the GRI guidelines. Post-Bio2020 indicates a period from 2011 to 2016. FemDir represents a board with at 
least one woman director. Bio-sensitive industries include five industrial sectors such as gas & utilities, mining, construction 





Table 6  
Correlation matrix 
Variables DBI BIA Diversity GRI Bio2020 B.size B.exp 
Independ
ence 
Separation ESG CSR EMS 
DBI  1.00            
BIA 0.30*** 1.00           
Diversity  0.26*** 0.06*** 1.00          
GRI 0.56*** 0.17*** 0.26*** 1.00         
Bio2020  0.25*** 0.07*** 0.36*** 0.23*** 1.00        
B.size  0.35*** 0.12*** 0.04*** 0.30*** -0.02 1.00       
B.exp  0.05*** 0.04*** -0.01 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 1.00      
Independence  0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.03 -0.07*** -0.22*** -0.08***  1.00     
Separation  -0.12*** -0.02 -0.06*** -0.08*** 0.00 -0.18*** -0.17***  0.05*** 1.00    
ESG  0.24*** 0.07*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.27*** -0.01 -0.02 0.08*** 0.10*** 1.00   
CSR  0.49*** 0.09*** 0.29*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.15*** 0.02 0.05*** -0.01 0.29*** 1.00  
EMS  0.34*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.32*** 0.10*** 0.22*** 0.03 0.02 -0.07*** 0.08*** 0.23*** 1.00 
Size  0.55*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.46*** 0.05*** 0.59*** -0.02 0.01 -0.16*** 0.12*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 







Three-way fixed-effects regression of Disclosure of biodiversity initiatives (DBI) score against 
gender diversity, institutional and control variables (Equation 1) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







Diversity 0.0128*** 0.0157*** 0.0108*** 0.0121*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.00228) (0.00377) (0.00280) (0.00313) (0.00331) 
GRI 0.758***   0.604*** 0.843*** 
 (0.0622)   (0.0888) (0.0852) 
Bio2020 0.637*** -0.0743 0.703***   
 (0.207) (1.231) (0.211)   
B.size 0.235** 0.395** 0.0461 0.396*** 0.150 
 (0.0916) (0.167) (0.112) (0.126) (0.135) 
B.exp 0.0948* -0.0246 0.126** 0.167* 0.0498 
 (0.0492) (0.0996) (0.0558) (0.0862) (0.0606) 
Connections 0.00446 -0.0761 0.0255 -0.0184 0.0384 
 (0.0331) (0.0621) (0.0389) (0.0497) (0.0453) 
Independence 0.00215** -0.000655 0.00558*** 0.00218 0.00329** 
 (0.00100) (0.00166) (0.00127) (0.00142) (0.00138) 
Separation -0.124* -0.0614 -0.209** -0.296*** 0.112 
 (0.0690) (0.109) (0.0835) (0.0984) (0.0956) 
ESG 0.202*** 0.144 0.218*** 0.117* 0.256*** 
 (0.0511) (0.0933) (0.0616) (0.0679) (0.0784) 
CSR 0.531*** 0.478*** 0.460*** 0.813*** 0.346*** 
 (0.0542) (0.118) (0.0619) (0.0791) (0.0751) 
EMS 0.139*** -0.0553 0.236*** 0.0403 0.205*** 
 (0.0533) (0.116) (0.0583) (0.0778) (0.0728) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0495 0.223** -0.00368 0.0790 -0.0147 
 (0.0370) (0.0941) (0.0399) (0.0560) (0.0492) 
Size 0.390*** 0.523*** 0.295*** 0.394*** 0.376*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0471) (0.0344) (0.0380) (0.0389) 
Profitability 0.00350 0.0166*** 0.00208 0.00643* 0.00163 
 (0.00241) (0.00582) (0.00225) (0.00374) (0.00311) 
Leverage -0.0050*** -0.00668** -0.00344** -0.0067*** -0.00351* 
 (0.00150) (0.00296) (0.00170) (0.00227) (0.00203) 
Employees 0.00275 0.0323 -0.0101 -0.00669 -0.00240 
 (0.0202) (0.0331) (0.0248) (0.0282) (0.0293) 
Shareholders 0.0421* 0.0151 0.0760** 0.0942*** 0.00930 
 (0.0242) (0.0416) (0.0296) (0.0332) (0.0336) 
Slack -0.503** -1.839*** -0.0797 -0.0532 -0.934*** 
 (0.203) (0.503) (0.212) (0.297) (0.288) 
Intensity 0.650*** 0.810*** 0.575*** 0.730*** 0.580*** 
 (0.0677) (0.116) (0.0809) (0.0895) (0.0969) 
Capex -0.000992 0.00414 -0.00366 3.67e-05 -0.00475 
 (0.00215) (0.00259) (0.00284) (0.00290) (0.00325) 
Growth -0.000141 -0.000154 -0.00023** -0.0004*** 0.000220* 
 (8.93e-05) (0.00017) (0.00010) (0.00013) (0.00013) 
Constant -6.370*** -7.358*** -4.940*** -6.799*** -5.694*** 
 (0.444) (1.422) (0.550) (0.559) (0.608) 
Country_Dy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year_Dy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry_Dy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,013 1,544 2,469 2,014 1,999 
R-squared 0.582 0.479 0.433 0.585 0.567 
Notes:  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The heteroskedasticity-adjusted 







Logit regression of biodiversity impact assessment (BIA) against gender diversity, institutional 
and control variables  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







Diversity 0.0391*** 0.0424*** -0.0187 0.0459*** 0.0349 
 (0.0122) (0.0139) (0.0781) (0.0174) (0.0224) 
GRI 1.134***   0.153 2.572*** 
 (0.409)   (0.434) (0.778) 
Bio2020 -2.307** -6.729*** -4.646   
 (1.051) (1.263) (3.888)   
B.size 1.064 2.078*** -2.507 0.722 1.746 
 (0.661) (0.773) (4.880) (1.180) (1.265) 
B.exp 0.467 -0.428 12.82*** 0.834 0.290 
 (0.402) (0.342) (3.960) (0.733) (0.595) 
Connections -0.111 -0.0217 -1.900 0.142 -0.0699 
 (0.174) (0.246) (1.567) (0.222) (0.324) 
Independence 0.000650 0.00302 0.0651 -0.00504 0.0110 
 (0.00483) (0.00589) (0.0465) (0.00811) (0.0130) 
Separation 0.146 0.183 -8.525 -0.304 1.025 
 (0.312) (0.383) (6.657) (0.393) (0.972) 
ESG 0.579** 0.355 2.947* 1.001** -0.151 
 (0.279) (0.320) (1.532) (0.419) (0.753) 
CSR -0.500 -0.897* -1.611 -1.054** -0.174 
 (0.421) (0.458) (1.791) (0.537) (0.648) 
EMS 1.329*** 1.680*** 3.995**  -0.0520 
 (0.416) (0.652) (1.586)  (0.634) 
Tobin’s Q -0.299 -0.00159 -11.24** -0.440 -0.638 
 (0.300) (0.404) (5.334) (0.439) (0.448) 
Size 0.279* 0.427** -2.827** 0.261 0.115 
 (0.154) (0.192) (1.177) (0.240) (0.257) 
Profitability -0.0148 -0.0257 0.109 0.00775 -0.0372** 
 (0.0126) (0.0181) (0.0677) (0.0179) (0.0182) 
Leverage 0.00131 -0.0256** 0.0256 -0.000236 0.0149 
 (0.00904) (0.0108) (0.0603) (0.0120) (0.0205) 
Employees 0.251* 0.292* 1.293*** 0.378*** 0.0537 
 (0.136) (0.175) (0.443) (0.141) (0.285) 
Shareholders 0.203 0.0491 5.915** 0.213 0.293 
 (0.126) (0.136) (2.663) (0.159) (0.214) 
Slack -6.715*** -10.88*** -33.44** -6.994*** -6.547 
 (2.231) (2.724) (15.66) (2.671) (4.247) 
Intensity 1.008*** 0.750 9.123** 1.238*** 0.850 
 (0.344) (0.459) (3.991) (0.452) (0.814) 
Capex 0.00998** 0.0160*** 0.0294 0.0142 0.0216*** 
 (0.00397) (0.00578) (0.0765) (0.0130) (0.00757) 
Growth 3.45e-05 -0.000140 0.00121 0.000271 -0.000109 
 (0.000579) (0.000893) (0.00349) (0.000764) (0.000953) 
Constant -18.92*** -22.82*** -11.26* -17.16*** -19.97*** 
 (2.668) (3.572) (6.088) (3.492) (5.076) 
Country_Dy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year_Dy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry_Dy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR Chi2 408.02*** 282.05*** 75.31*** 138.92*** 212.19*** 
Pseudu R2 0.339 0.309 0.698 0.315 0.401 
Observations 3,026 1,920 542 788 1,273 
Notes:  ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. We use logit regression to explain BIA, which is a binary dependent variable 
(see, Matsumura et al., 2014). For logit regressions, Pseudu R2 measures how well the independent variables explain the 
dependent variable, with higher Pseudu R2 value indicating better explanatory power of the model. 
